Resumo

One important discussion in the field of law and economics focus on the merits of alternative ways to deter illicit behavior. The classical economic model of crime predicts that, either monetary sanctions – such as fines – or imprisonment, can work as a deterrence factor for illicit activities (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1974). While most contributions in the economics literature focused on the deterrent effects of imprisonment (Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2004; Kline, 2012), the tradeoff among distinct types of punishment has received far less attention (Piehl & Williams, 2011).

The present paper presents novel evidence related to the effects of fines in a field setting. I study the behavior of users in a university library during a ten-year period (2005-2015), covering more than 800,000 daily transactions. In doing so, I want to answer the following question: how does the introduction of a monetary sanction affect behavior in this specific setting?

This paper dialogues with several literatures. First, the results presented here corresponds to an empirical analysis related to the public enforcement of law, a situation in which victims may not know who is injuring them. Second, this paper’s results also relate to contexts in which agents might value nonmonetary factors, such as customs or social norms, making the instauration of monetary sanctions a less effective instrument to deter certain behaviors. Finally, the paper’s findings relate to the literature in social dilemmas, such as common-pool resources’ management, for instance.

I exploit variation in the introduction of a monetary sanction (fine) in the library in a specific year to uncover a causal effect of such a sanction over user behavior. One particular advantage of this setting is that the change in the type of sanction was not the same for all library users. This unique feature of the data allows me to employ a difference-in-differences research design in order to evaluate the effects of the policy implemented by the library.

I uncover two main results. First, in aggregate terms, the instauration of a monetary sanction in the library reduced users’ delays, as predicted by standard law enforcement models. Second, since the nominal value of the fine remained the same (R$ 2.00) during a ten-year period (2006/2015), this specific type of sanction lost efficacy over time. I report estimates of the dynamic effects of fines, which suggest that the fine deterred illicit behavior in the short run, only.

These results have important implications, both in practical and theoretical grounds. In terms of practice, the results provide valuable insight for important organizational issues, such as agency and teamwork issues, for example. In terms of theory, the results in this paper not only provide a better understanding of the impacts of fines over illicit behavior, but they also shed light on related issues, such as economic incentives, social norms, and corruption in real-world settings.

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