Resumo

Título do Artigo

BEHAVIORAL AGENCY RESEARCH AND THEORY: A BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS
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Palavras Chave

Behavioral agency
Corporate governance
Bibliometric

Área

Estratégia em Organizações

Tema

Governança Corporativa

Autores

Nome
1 - RUBENS MUSSOLIN MASSA
ESCOLA DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE SÃO PAULO (FGV-EAESP) - Sao Paulo
2 - Raul Beal Partyka
UNIVERSIDADE DO VALE DO ITAJAÍ (UNIVALI) - PPGA
3 - Jeferson Lana
ESCOLA DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE SÃO PAULO (FGV-EAESP) - São Paulo

Reumo

Behavioral agency institutional pressures and corporate responses. More broadly from the standpoint of corporate governance, corporate governance conditions, the CEO, top executives, managers, among others, can reinforce organizational resilience or substantial compliance with institutional demands (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia and Larraza-Kintana, 2010).
In this bibliometric study, we aim to better understand future gaps from the theory of behavioral agency. Generally, the models combine elements of internal corporate governance and their problems to explain the executive behavior of taking risks. Executive risk-taking varies between different forms of monitoring, and these can exhibit risk behaviors as well as risk-averse behaviors (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Behavioral agency theory provides a better framework for theorizing executive pay, an improved theory of agent behavior, and an improved platform for making recommendations about planning executive compensation plans (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Boards chaired by non-executives and dominated by non-executive directors are no longer adept at mandated pay performance by CEOs than executive-dominated boards (Capezio, Shields, & O'Donnell, 2011).
Bibliometric methods reveal a great potential for the quantitative confirmation of subjectively derived categories in published evaluations, as well as to explore the research scenario and identify categories. Most articles found have their approach to family businesses. One of the motivations may be given to larger family businesses. In smaller ones, from the point of view, the intimate and personal nature of such companies can make them ideal places for administration (Le Breton-Miller, Miller & Lester, 2011).
Unethical behavior, agency problems, CEO compensation and risk change are some of the side effects of shareholder wealth maximization (SWM) (Yahanpath & Joseph, 2011). Studies will be important in determining the motivation, especially of agency problems. Finally, bibliometric methods do not replace extensive reading and synthesis. Bibliometrics can reliably link publications, authors or journals, and produce tables, maps, and graphs of published research, but it is up to the researcher and your knowledge of the field to interpret the findings - which is the hardest part.
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