Resumo

Ownership structure of Brazilian firm is characterized by the presence of majority control, high shareholding concentration, non-voting share issuance, and pyramidal control structures. However, there has been a trend towards a reduction in the concentration of voting rights and excess voting rights, with a growth in the number of firms with shared control and no controlling shareholder. These different configurations of shareholding control can have consequences for the type and magnitude of agency conflicts, affecting the relationship between shareholding concentration and firm value.

This study aims to verify whether the type of shareholding control (dispersed, shared or majority) affects agency conflicts in the Brazilian market. We analyze the relationship between the type of shareholding control and firm value and the relationship between attributes of shareholding concentration and firm value. The paper deepens the analysis of the ownership structure as relevant in the Brazilian market by assimilating the type of shareholding control as able to affect firm value and to condition the effect of ownership concentration on firm value.

The differents configurations of shareholding control can affect the type and magnitude of agency conflicts prevalent in Brazilian firms. Firms with dispersed control face the principal-agent agency model, where higher voting rights concentration is seen as a mechanism to align interests. The presence of defined controlling shareholder, especially majority control, favors the principal-principal agency model. In this case, high voting rights concentration combined with excessive voting rights increase the risk of expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders.

Models are estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), which corrects problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals. To obtain robust results, models are also estimated with Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) which deals with endogeneity problems and provides better estimates for short periods of time. Models are estimated for three sub-samples, according to the type of shareholding control (majority, shared and dispersed), and the coefficients of variables for the shareholding concentration are compared among the three groups.

Using a sample of 1,224 firm-year observations from 160 listed Brazilian firms in the period 2010-2017, we find that shared control and dispersed control are beneficial to firm value, while majority control destroys firm value. The analysis of the shareholding concentration reveals that: (i) concentration of voting rights depreciates the value of firms with dispersed control; (ii) excess voting rights negatively affect the value of firms with shared control and majority control; and (iii) cash flow rights increases the value of firms with majority control.

The categorization adopted for shareholding control (dispersed, shared and majority) showed that the dispersion of shareholding control can reduce agency conflicts between controlling and majority shareholders, as well as raise conflicts between dispersed shareholders and managers. The findings indicate that majority control presents the greatest possibility for agency conflicts. The consequences of shared control for agency conflicts are still unknown but these firms are better valued than firms with one dominant shareholder. The results indicate that dispersed control favors firm value.

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