Resumo

Overall, organizations seek to strengthen ties with the environment in order to preserve and attract value (Jonhson & Mitton, 2003). Among the important links of firms with the environment is politics (Mahonet et al., 1981). In Brazil, according to Astorino (2015), the government has historically had a central role in the economy, helding close relationship with business elite. Faoro (2001) and Holanda (1995) suggest that the Brazilian state was founded on the system of patrimonialism, a form of political domination characterized by the absence of frontiers between public and private domains

The present study aims to answer the following research question: do political connections, measured through contributions to electoral campaigns, influence the performance of companies in Brazil? Within this context, this paper intends to contribute to the studies focusing on the influence of the political context on the performance of organizations. The companies’ performance will be measured by the following dimensions: (i) access to credit from development banks; (ii) equity participation in development banks; and (iii) international expansion.

Through political connections, firms seek to find imperfections in the market, becoming more competitive in turn. The effects of this relationship may favor performance outreach rather than traditional mercantile strategies (Barney, 1986). For Fejgelman (2016), there is no consensus among the authors about the results of political connections for companies. Some studies show the political connections as having great potential to influence government activities (Hillman et al., 1999). There are also studies that have contradictory results on the real benefits of such connections.

In this research, the population is formed by the Brazilian firms that have shares listed in B3, between 2007 and 2016. Five research sources are considered: (i) Economática®; (ii) B3 portal; (iii) TSE portal; (iv) BNDES portal; and (v) FDC (Dom Cabral Foundation) portal. To understand the dynamics between the elections and the analyzed variables the Driscoll-Kraay model with robust standard error was adopted, as some regression assumptions were violated - normality, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation of residues -, as recommended by Wooldridge (2010) and Hoechle (2007).

Evidence obtained brought important insights to the research hypotheses: (i) there are clues that confirm the H1 hypothesis, that politically connected firms tend to have preferential access to BNDES credit; (ii) there are some evidences that confirms the H2 hypothesis, that politically connected firms tend to have preferential access to BNDESPar equity participation; and (iii) there are some signs that confirm the hypothesis H3, that politically connected firms tend to expand internationally more than the non-politically ones.

In general, the evidence found in this article supports the recent change in Brazil's electoral financing system, since the new model has the potential to reduce political influence in companies since these are prohibited from donating to the campaigns elections. This effect brings in the possibility for the development of new academic studies that could confirm or refute this hypothesis. Other suggestions for future studies include the analysis of the probable alternative forms for the financing of electoral campaigns.

Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2007). Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions. Journal of Financial Economics. Faccio, M. (2006). Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review. v. 96, pp. 369-386. Faccio, M. (2010). Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis. Financial Management. pp. 905-927. Lazzarini, S. G., Musacchio, A., Bandeira-de-Mello, R., & Marcon, R. (2011). What do Development Banks Do? Evidence from Brazil, 2002-2009. Harvard Business School. Working Paper.