Resumo

In recent years, several studies observed that a portion of milk producers abandoned the activity due to difficulties in meeting institutional and market demands and identified problems of information asymmetry between agents. Besides, the transactions in the dairy AGS are predominantly coordinated via informal agreements, which associated with information problems make room for the capture of rent. This study deals with efficiency of transactions between producers and processors in the dairy AGS in Paraná according to Transaction Costs Economics and Measurement Costs Economics.

This article aimed to understand how governance structures and the search for value protection influence transaction costs in the relationship between dairy producers and processors in Paraná.

These aspects are treated by Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and by Measurement Cost Economics (MCE). Both of them discuss the main factors that influence competition between agents and efficiency of transaction. However, as Zylbersztajn (2018) argued, TCE and MCE still have some differences that justify the study of efficiency of transactions from these two perspectives. In general, it can be considered that in search for efficiency TCE focuses its analysis on governance structures, while MCE discusses the mechanisms which protect value and agents’ property rights.

For data collection, we conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with 18 small and medium-sized milk producers, ten processors and two key agents, one consultant and one organic milk producer who sells directly to consumers. The respondents were located in Northwest, West, Southwest, North-Central and Central-Eastern regions in Paraná. Besides, for data treatment and results analysis we used Content Analysis, proposed by Bardin (2011).

As a result, it was identified that the hybrid governance structure with the use of informal agreements predominates among the cases interviewed and is in line with the assumptions of TCE. However, even in the presence of measurement, there is still information asymmetry on the producer side, given that he does not know the price to be paid for milk at the time of negotiation. In these conditions, there are still risks of value appropriation on the producer side in the absence of complete information, as discussed in MCE. Finally, in general it was observed that the agents seek value protectio

In search for value protection, it was observed that the hybrid structure based on informal agreements manages to adapt to environmental uncertainties, yet it is not sufficient to protect the economic rights. Thus, in the absence of a formal contract, agents become exposed to higher transaction costs, which arise to protect value, to negotiate for better prices, formalized information and guarantees that the agreed value will be paid. For this reason, it was considered that if the hybrid structure can be efficient through TCE, it can still present inefficiencies and considerations on MCE.

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