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Resumo do trabalho
Finanças · Governança Corporativa, Risco e Compliance
Título
DO MANAGERS GET PAID FOR EARNINGS QUALITY? A STUDY ON ACCRUALS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Palavras-chave
Accruals
Executive Compensation
Corporate Governance
Autores
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Bruno MilaniUNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA MARIA (UFSM)
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Alexandre SILVA DE OLIVEIRAFUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO PAMPA - UNIPAMPA (UNIPAMPA)
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ROGERIO HAUSCHILDTUNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA MARIA (UFSM)
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Igor Bernardi SonzaUNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA MARIA (UFSM)
Resumo
Introdução
Accruals improve earnings quality but allow managerial discretion, which may be used to influence executive compensation. Based on agency theory, this study investigates whether total and discretionary accruals are associated with different forms of executive pay, and whether corporate governance mechanisms moderate this relationship, contributing to the debate on earnings quality and incentive alignment.________________________________________
Problema de Pesquisa e Objetivo
This study aims to investigate whether accruals, both total and discretionary, are associated with different components of executive compensation, including base salary, bonuses, and equity-based pay. Specifically, we examine whether higher accruals are linked to increased compensation, and whether corporate governance variables mitigate this relationship.
Fundamentação Teórica
Based on agency theory and corporate governance literature, executive compensation is both a tool for alignment and a potential source of opportunism. Accruals can be used to manipulate reported performance, impacting pay. Governance mechanisms such as board independence and ownership structure can moderate this effect. (La Porta et al., 2000).
Metodologia
The study analyzes 322 publicly traded Brazilian firms (2010–2022), totaling 2,222 panel observations. Total and discretionary accruals were calculated mainly using models from Dechow (1994) and Jones (1991). Five compensation variables were regressed on accruals using robust OLS with control variables and fixed effects. Winsorization was applied, and diagnostic tests for normality, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity were conducted to ensure model reliability.
Análise dos Resultados
Regression results reveal that total accruals (TACC) are negatively associated with total and average executive compensation, while discretionary accruals (DACC) show a negative effect on bonuses. Equity and ROE positively influence all compensation types. Governance mechanisms—such as board independence, board size, and CEO-Chairman duality—are linked to lower pay, suggesting a moderating role. Overall, results support the view that accruals and governance affect how firms structure executive compensation.
Conclusão
This study finds that accruals affect executive pay differently across compensation types. Total accruals reduce total and average pay but increase bonuses and shares, suggesting varied incentive effects. Discretionary accruals show limited influence, with some negative impact on bonuses. Governance mechanisms, such as board independence and CEO duality, help restrain excessive compensation. These results highlight the importance of governance in moderating accounting-based incentives.
Contribuição / Impacto
This study contributes to the literature by revealing that accruals influence executive compensation differently across its components and are moderated by governance mechanisms. It highlights the role of accounting discretion in shaping incentive structures and underscores the importance of strong governance to prevent opportunistic behavior in emerging markets, in the context of Brazilian companies.
Referências Bibliográficas
Dechow, P. M. (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(1), 3–42.
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1–3), 85–107.
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 193–228.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 3–27.
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1–3), 85–107.
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 193–228.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 3–27.