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## **SPECTRA AND LESSONS FROM CATACUMBA REGARDING THE TRANSITION TO THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: a Bourdieusian perspective**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Between 1954 and 1960, in the midst of war, over two million Algerian peasants - a quarter of the population - were forcibly displaced. Taken from their homes and villages, they were resettled in camps controlled by the French military in what is known as one of the largest rural population displacements in world history. In this context, Bourdieu and some collaborators set out to examine the transformations in the fundamental structures of the economy and in the peasants' thinking (Bourdieu, 1977, 1962, 1958; Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet, Seibel, 1977; Bourdieu & Sayad, 1964).

By destroying the spatial and temporal frameworks of community existence and reorganizing peasants' lives, the process of uprooting Algerians completed what the colonial policy of land confiscation and dissemination of monetary exchanges had initiated: the "destatization" of agrarian communities dispossessed of their social and cultural means to make sense of the present and orient their future. The deconstruction of the traditional way of life will be further exacerbated by the urban conditions of resettlement, with economic, cultural, political and behavioral implications that impose on the "uprooted" a scenario of extreme uncertainty. Through detailed analysis of this process, Bourdieu and some colleagues have provided an in-depth account of both the destruction of a traditional way of life and its effects on colonial power.

Arriving in Algeria in 1956 and leaving in 1960, Bourdieu published, during this period, his first book - *Sociologie de L'Algérie* (Bourdieu, 1958) - based on field investigations among the Kabyle peasants from the Mahgreb and poor people from the urban periphery of Algiers and its surroundings. The collected dataset provides sufficient material for a substantial body of publications over the next few decades. It is a collection to which he has returned several times throughout his career (Jenkins, 2006).

In this direction, in 1963, in *Travail et Travailleurs en Algérie*, Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet and Seibel, proceeded to a meticulous survey of the formation and growing abyss between the stable industrial proletariat and the sub-proletariat without initiative, condemned to the poverty economy of the streets and the "traditionalism of despair", which makes it susceptible to all forms of political manipulation.

Later, Bourdieu and Sayad (1964) published *Le Déracinement*, in which they described the process of accelerated destruction of the Algerian peasantry under the pressure of land dispossession, the commodification of social relations and the forced settlement of millions of people imposed by the French army in its failed effort to contain the nationalist insurgency. In this work, they weave a comprehensive picture of the ways of life and the impacts of the colonial administration on the Algerian social structures, allowing analysis of ruptures caused by the transformation of the economic practices and the disruption of the traditional housing, aggregation and socialization. This was with emphasis on its effects on the disaggregation of culture and traditional economy resulting from the introduction of colonial capitalism in the country.

From the set of investigated transformations, Bourdieu and collaborators portrayed the emergence of an "agriculture without farmers" and "towns without inhabitants", leaving an entire population suspended in the fractures of history, "floating between two cultures" (Bourdieu, 1962; 1977; 2000b); in a society steeped in contradictions and marked by ambiguity, instability and uncertainty (Jenkins, 2006).

When questioning the possibilities of studying a society deeply transformed by war and capitalism at the precise moment changes were taking place, as well as when asking about the possibilities of preserving the methodological and theoretical coherence of the analysis without renouncing ideological convictions about the elements that came into play, Bourdieu revolutionized the social science field, either by demonstrating that scientific and political value can be strengthened, or by incorporating an ethnographic approach to sociological studies that uses all the resources at its disposal - interviews, statistics, surveys, photographs (Jenkins, 2006).

In general terms, Bourdieu proceeded to analysis of diverse themes, such as sociability and solidarity relations, gender work division, introduction of necessary provisions for economic calculation and monetary management, transition in ways of living and in the relationship between the family and the domestic space, notions of work and forms of job search, captivating sectors of the general public with varied interests (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, Passeron, 1991).

The reflection on the agents' perceptions of the future and action strategies that emerged from the studies about Algeria responded to questions, present in the spirit of its time, including questions about the social and political destiny of the country in the face of the struggle against a colonial administration to which the replacement of the peasant way of life was attributed the combination of poverty, uprootedness and precariousness. Large contingents of population were displaced from their lands, an element that was at the heart of Algerian social, economic and community life. Added to the expropriations were displacement, the migration of massive contingents and the deterioration of housing conditions (Klüger, 2021).

For part of the population, the anti-colonial struggle represented a moment of acquisition of political awareness and the emergence of aspirations for social transformation. For many, however, the long war mainly generated a feeling of resentment, despair and disconnection, resulting from the mutilation of their ways of life, work and housing. In this sense, whereas the rural population were dispossessed of their land, the unemployed and the urban sub-'proletariat formed potentially revolutionary contingents, but their sense of revolt was disorganized and disunited, devoid of a clear future project, often leading to fatalistic daydreams or resignations (Bourdieu, 2000a).

Among the contributions present in Bourdieu's writings on Algeria, the formulation about the process of constitution of the *habitus* according to the social position and path of the agents is outstanding, followed by observations regarding the influence the *habitus* exerts on the formation of visions of the future, as well as the definition of strategies mobilized by agents when taking decisions and acting in the world. Such theoretical development fits and supports the vast set of studies in which Bourdieu outlined the relational distribution of agents' practices and decision-making, based on their social origins and trajectories.

Recalling the ancient Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of *hexis*, used in studies on the virtues of designating an acquired, firmly established state of the moral character that guides human feelings and desires - and, consequently, their conduct in a given situation, the notion of *habitus* is adopted by Bourdieu with a view to forging a dispositional theory of action capable of reintroducing in structuralist anthropology the inventive capacity of agents without reverting to Cartesian intellectualism that biases the subjectivist approaches to social conduct (Wacquant, 2006).

Thus, as a *mediating category*, which seeks to transcend the boundary between the "objective" and the "subjective", the concept of *habitus* allows Bourdieu to capture and describe the agitated double world of crumbling colonial Algeria. In this troubled world, social and mental structures were not only malfunctioning in relation to one another, they themselves formed a varied mixture of deep-rooted tradition and colonial imposition, with the strategies of the autochthonous predisposed to oscillate between two antinomic principles, namely, on the

one hand, the logic of honor, kinship and group solidarity, and, on the other, the pressure of individual interests, market relations and material gains. Uprooted peasants and urban sub-proletarians are thus viewed as bifurcated beings, disoriented and acculturated by the combined experience of war and the wrecking of established social relations (Wacquant, 2006).

By integrating the notion of *hysteresis* - temporal interval between the incidence of a social force and the development of its effects through delayed mediation of the incorporation and sequential sedimentation of capacities and temporal dispositions - the notion of *habitus* allowed Bourdieu to enhance the behavior of the colonial system, through the discordant dispositions and confused expectations that it introduced in the subjects, as well as its survival till the end of French rule and the establishment of an independent Algerian state (Wacquant, 2006).

Since his first elaborations, anchored in a double critique: of “subjectivism” and “objectivism”, Bourdieu sought to emphasize the specificity of the logics of practices that unfold in concrete situations, in the daily life of social spaces. As a result, he proposed that practice was neither the mechanical precipitate of structural dictates nor the result of the intentional pursuit of goals by individuals. Rather, for him it constituted the product of the dialectical relationship between “situation” and “*habitus*”, understood as a system of durable, transposable dispositions, which, integrating all past experiences, worked in each moment as a matrix of perceptions, making it possible to fulfill infinitely different tasks thanks to the analogic transfer of schemes acquired in previous practice (Catani, 2017).

Thus, the *habitus* presupposes a set of principles of vision and tastes that guide the choice of individuals and that direct them to act in certain ways. Social agents endowed with distinct *habitus* tend, as a result, to behave differently and, therefore, constitute a differentiating principle. Concomitantly, it is acquired by agents through the interiorization of social structures, structures that carry individual and collective histories that are incorporated by agents. When socializing, agents are likely to dominate, even without full awareness, the working laws of their group and behave in accordance with these dispositions. Therefore, people of the same class tend to have quite harmonized practices, more than they know or even want, because, when guided by the laws, each one adjusts to the other.

Equipped with such a framework, the young Bourdieu emphasized, in equal measure, the examination of the way in which the awareness of economic conditions and the potential for organizing coherent expectations regarding the future varied according to the social position occupied by agents. The correlation observed was then summarized in the formula: “each of the economic and social conditions corresponds to a system of practices and dispositions organized around the relationship with the future that is involved therein” (Bourdieu, 2021).

Conformed in this way, the *habitus* unifies “the provisions that presuppose the practical reference to the future objective, whether it is resignation or revolt against the current order or the ability to subject economic conduct to forecast and calculation” (Bourdieu, 2021, p. 159). As a result, “in the absence of reasonable expectations, only daydreaming and utopia remain” Bourdieu (2021, p. 106).

For Klüger (2021), looking towards the future was, in fact, a central element of the panorama outlined by Bourdieu about the mismatch between the dispositions to act previously cultivated by the Algerians and the new objective situations arising from the introduction of colonial capitalism and the dissolution of traditional ways of life.

The advent of colonial capitalism progressively displaced the functioning of the economy from the codes of honor that presided over social integration, meaning a feeling of honor “[...] nothing but the cultivated disposition, the *habitus*, which allows each agent to generate, from a small number of implicit principles, all behaviors according to the rules of the logic of challenge and response, and only these behaviors, thanks to so many other inventions that the stereotyped unfolding of a ritual would in no way require” (Bourdieu, 2021, p. 190).

The exchange is then dissociated from the relationship; the loan, from the social bond; the good, from fruition; and the productive action starts to be conceived mainly as profitable. The relationship with time is, therefore, distorted, as the individual is compelled to manage the present in order to ensure the future availability of monetary resources (Bourdieu, 2021).

In describing the Algerian disenchantment, Bourdieu (2021) narrated how the introduction of currency and salaried work, combined with reduced formal employment opportunities and the low professional qualification of the population, led to the appearance of a myriad of unprofitable informal occupations. Likewise, it indicated that, because they were halfway between the two patterns, it gave rise to Algerian peasants making original adaptations to the urban setting, allowing creative forms of community sociability and mutual help relationships, characteristic of the preceding social arrangement, in order to subsist in the city (Bourdieu, 2021).

Housing, which was previously part of the community, was thus removed from the nucleus of origin, separating residents from their kin and depriving them of their social ties and sources of mutual help. Similarly, it empirically demonstrated that calculation, consumption capacity, use of credit, projects and concepts of property and future profitability, among other economic practices specific to the capitalist system, required provisions that were not natural or equally distributed, but historically gestated and unequally distributed according to the social positions of agents (Bourdieu, 2021).

By opposing the dominant economic science and offering a new framework for the investigation of socioeconomic transition processes, Bourdieu's writings on Algeria fully contributed to sociological studies of economics and development. The Bourdieusian approach added an analytical layer, demonstrating the interest in detailing, in different contexts, the modes of incorporation of dispositions and economic categories and examining the variation and dissonances as a function of the agents' social position (Klüger, 2021).

The collective work and methodological combination employed by Bourdieu (2021) are equally transported into contemporary reality, resulting in a broad research program focused on examining variations in *habitus* as a function of social positions and life trajectories, as well as, at the same time, in the relational analysis of practices and taking positions in terms of *habitus*.

*Dépaysement*, a term that refers to the change in perspectives and disruption of *habitus* caused by displacement to different countries, regions or distinct spatialities, constitutes, in this process, a fundamental inflection point in Bourdieu's trajectory and a crucial moment in both the shaping of his perspective, whether in choosing his objects of study, or in shaping his research practices (Klüger, 2021).

Above all, as concluded by Klüger (2021), the initial studies by Bourdieu (2021) lead us to think, by comparison and contrast, how other societies, with other population compositions, cosmologies, productive structures, colonial histories, process transformations. of an economic, social and political nature, as well as correlated transmutations in the *habitus* of their agents.

Practically at the same time that Bourdieu was studying Algerian society, Janice E. Perlman, professor at the Institute for Urban and Regional Development at the University of California, Berkeley, proposed to conduct wide-ranging research involving 750 residents and community leaders in Rio de Janeiro *favelas* (shantytowns): Catacumba, Nova Brasília and Caxias. In each of these locations, 200 randomly selected residents and 50 local leaders, including men and women between 16 and 66, were surveyed and submitted to a face-to-face questionnaire (Perlman, 2002).

Although starting from different theoretical and epistemological perspectives, Perlman, like Bourdieu, made use of multiple research techniques, including the application of a questionnaire prepared from participant observation developed in each of the study target communities, semi-structured interviews and an in-depth, open questionnaire of a pre-test

character. The final instrument comprised four sections: sociodemographic and professional data, urban experience, attitudes and values and, finally, political life. In addition, a chronological history of each respondent was compiled, year by year, with records of changes in residence, occupation, education and family life (Perlman, 2002).

The data collected in Catacumba, in August 1969, were compiled using punch cards, transferred to magnetic tape and later taken to the United States where they were verified and submitted to statistical treatment using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences - SPSS, the reliability and validity controls being highly satisfactory (Perlman, 2002).

A year later (1970), the approximately six thousand residents of the Catacumba community, located on the shore of the lagoon, Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, in the supervalued region of the city's South Zone, were resettled, for the most part, in the newly built Guaporé-Quitungo Complex by the Rio de Janeiro State Popular Housing Company - COHAB-RJ, in the Penha region, while others were transferred to Cidade de Deus, Vila Aliança and Nova Holanda, which, over time, became new *favelas*. After being reforested and undergoing landscaping work, the vacant area was transformed into Parque da Catacumba (Perlman, 2002).

In mid-1973, Perlman returned to Rio de Janeiro, with a view to updating her research and following the life of the *favelados* (shantytown dwellers) in Catacumba, removed from their homes and relocated via residential housing projects. She also visited other *favelas* and housing projects in other areas of Brazil, in order to put the experience of Rio de Janeiro into broader perspective (Perlman, 2002).

It is in this context that the proposal of this article is situated, based on findings and results obtained by Perlman (2002) in Catacumba, initially in 1969 and later in 1973, when it had already been eradicated and its residents relocated through different housing schemes, to investigate, in the light of the perspective of Bourdieu's theory of action of practice (2021), how the notions of *habitus* and *dépaysement* were mobilized through different strategies - stereotyping, mythification, cooptation, uprooting, disenchantment, coercion - and their impacts of disruption of traditional forms of housing, aggregation and socialization on local modes of social structuring and agency.

It also aims to highlight categories, dimensions and variables resulting from the case under analysis on the ongoing transition, catalyzed by the Covid-19 pandemic, to the fourth industrial revolution, notably among "marginal" strata of the population in economies on the fringes of the dynamics in progress, such as Brazil. A re-reading of studies on the Catacumba community may be relevant, not only to the more systemic inclusion of the theme of Revolution 4.0 in the strategic priority agenda of institutions and organizations in these economies, but also the formulation of public policies to mitigate the impacts of this trajectory, as well as the development of leaders able to manage them, from a posture that is based on a "bricoler" orientation (Stinchfield, Nelson, Wood, 2013; Levi-Strauss, 1962) that fosters the use "of what is at hand", including the wealth of particularities and capital present in the "marginalized" - "outliers" - of the lower circuit of the economy, whose skills, paradoxically, are essential to the standards of competitiveness - or rather, of "collaboration" - valued in the stage of development of production processes and regulation of (post-)work, marked by flexibility and precariousness.

As Foster (2017) noted, writers, artists, and scientists tend to seem to have the ability to anticipate reality. For the author, however, such ability, curiously, expands the more they develop the ability to be surprised by the quotidian, with repetitions, observing the cycles, contours and limits that they cause for the human. In this way, they are restless in the search for original ways to (re-)treat them, (re-)signify them, thus transforming them. In this direction, for this author, a relevant factor for the development of this capacity was to revive production, approaches, methods and theories produced by these thinkers, in particular, in the forty, fifty, sixty years that preceded us. In their time, they were already aiming for what would be our

present. From now on, it will be up to the scientists of our time to understand what is configured in reality, the changes and permanencies in the patterns of our daily lives, the new ways in which the past is repeated, corroborating series, laws and theories, and, finally, to outline a meaning for the next forty, fifty, sixty years, for the next generations.

## **HABITUS AND LOCAL DYNAMICS**

According to Perlman (2002), documents produced at the time of the research by the Secretariat of Social Services in Brazil described a *favela* as a group of housing with high density occupation, built in a disorderly manner with inadequate materials, without zoning, devoid of public services, and used illegally without the owner's consent.

For her, from the outside, the typical *favela* looks like a congested, filthy human anthill. Women walk around carrying large water cans on their heads or crowd around the community water spout, washing clothes. Men hang around bars chatting or playing cards, apparently with nothing to do. Naked children play in the dirt and mud. The houses seem, to say the least, unsafe, made as they are from mismatched pieces of refuse. Open sewers give off a nauseating smell, especially on hot, windless days. Earth and dust everywhere, on windy days, and when it rains the mud cascades down the street (Perlman, 2002).

Inside, reported Perlman (2002), things, however, look quite different. The construction of houses takes comfort and efficiency into account, taking into account the climate and the materials available. The arrangement of the furniture denotes whimsy, as well as the cleanliness of each room. Homes often feature brightly painted doors and shutters, with flowers and plants on the windowsills. Pets are displayed with pride and affection. Most men and women get up early and work hard all day long. Women who find themselves doing laundry often make a living this way, and many of the men seen in bars are waiting to start their shifts. The children, even though they don't always go to school, generally seem smart, alert and healthy. Their parents place great importance on providing them with as much education as possible. Nor does the casual observer notice the remarkable degree of social cohesion and mutual trust, and the complex internal social organization, which is expressed in numerous clubs and spontaneous associations (Perlman, 2002).

In this sense, the author indicates three attitudes towards *favela* agglomerates, as summarized in Chart 1.

### CHART 1

#### *Favela: Different associated Habitus*

Notion of Favela	Associated Habitus
<b><i>Favela as pathological agglomerations</i></b>	A <i>favela</i> consists of a disorderly agglomeration of vagabonds, unemployed, abandoned women and children, thieves, drunks and prostitutes. These “marginal elements” live in “subhuman” conditions, without piped water, a sewage system, garbage collection, and other basic urban services, in a dirty, unsanitary environment. A <i>favela</i> , ugly as it is, detracts from the city's picturesque panorama. Economically and socially, it constitutes a drain, a parasite, demanding high expenditures on public services and giving little retribution. <i>Favela</i> dwellers live apart, contribute neither in terms of skills nor even as purchasing power for the general good. Rather, they constitute a public threat. Furthermore, the land they occupy is often very valuable, so <i>favela</i> prevent them from being used more profitably, in addition to devaluing neighboring properties. Whenever possible, the inhabitants should be removed to more remote areas, where land is cheaper and they can live in housing that meets “minimum standards”. This negative view is the dominant myth on the subject.
<b><i>Favela as communities overcoming difficulties</i></b>	A <i>favela</i> is understood as a community inhabited by dynamic, honest, capable people, who could improve their neighborhood if they were given the opportunity. <i>Favelados</i> contribute to the economy as workers and consumers, and through the improvements they make to their land and homes. Over time, a <i>favela</i> will naturally evolve into a productive neighborhood fully integrated into the city. Residents' entrepreneurial skills and organizational spirit are clearly revealed in their collective effort, in public services in the community, as well as in the complex network of social organizations. These stronghold relatives of backward people actually constitute an important component of Brazil's cultural identity. There are many sources of satisfaction in the <i>favela</i> , such as “variety, adventure, convenience, loyalty, a sense of community, and mutual self-help. Rather than removing <i>favelas</i> , this second position would imply an official policy of legalizing and urbanizing the locality, granting <i>favelados</i> titles to their land, providing them with easy access to sources of finance, long-term loans and technical assistance, thus allowing them to become agents of their own improvement.
<b><i>Favela as unavoidable calamities</i></b>	A <i>favela</i> is seen as a natural, albeit unfortunate, consequence of rapid urban growth. <i>Favelados</i> are considered useful as cheap labor and easy-to-buy votes, despite being judged to be economically unproductive, politically unprepared, and socially undesirable. Those who defend this position adopt the paternalistic view that <i>favelados</i> are like children – they need to be guided, taught and educated by the good will of the more fortunate, without necessarily having to change the basic structure of the situation. The best programs are palliatives, such as distributing food and clothing, organizing health centers, mothers' clubs, among others. It is believed that, with this type of policy, the most deserving <i>favelados</i> will overcome countless obstacles and integrate into society.

**Source:** Based on Perlman, 2002, p. 40.

In demographic terms, although it was difficult to specify the proportions between the genders in favelas at that time, given the lack of census studies, Perlman (2002) found in Catacumba, a higher percentage of women (55%) than men (45%). This imbalance was probably due to the fact that men had greater options - such as living in a barracks, at a construction site, or a pension - and because migration rates are a little higher for women.

As for racial types, 21% of *favelados* were black, 30% mixed race, and 49% white. These black people represent practically all the blacks in Rio de Janeiro; on the contrary, white *favelados* are only a fraction of the white population (Perlman, 2002).

The average age of *favelados* is 34. As for marital status, 24% are single, 66% married or in a stable relationship, 5% separated, and 5% widowed. As in the modern city of the time, the nuclear family prevails in the *favela*, rather than the broader kinship group. In the



Catacumba, Perlman (2002) registered 90% as nuclear families, with an average of 4.6 children, around half the figure in the rural areas (60 - 70%).

Regarding *favelados* of working age, 28% were unemployed, and 13% had never worked. The most worrying data, however, referred to education, which had been treated as a relatively unimportant variable, both in magnitude and in significance. Migrants, like natives, do not have a free choice in terms of occupations. Their careers seemed unaffected by the new educational opportunities opening up in the city, or even in their original communities. Social background and age tended to determine professional status.

As for local community leaders, the data indicated a predominance of men, in a proportion of nine out of ten. In addition, they were predominantly white (65%), with an average of seven years more than the average age (41 years) of the total population. They are literate and employed (Perlman, 2002).

The author also registered a similarity between the situation of these leaders and indigenous chiefs. Both were locals, not strangers, and interested in everything related to their areas rather than isolated issues. Although the *favelas* did not have a single leader who maintained exclusive control over links with external authorities, a group of leaders assumed the role of political intermediary ("brokers") to guard over the crucial connections and synapses of the relationships of the *favela*'s local system with the external ones (Pearse, 1961). As later noted by Peattie (1968), and more recently by scholars, the notion of a "structural hole" (authors), access to higher levels of authority made a fundamental difference in defending local interests.

In short, participation in the administrative area among *favela* leaders, as among the rest of the residents, was the most frequent modality of political involvement. 85% participated in measures, such as consulting a lawyer, seeking other professional advice, using banking services or arranging for enrollment in social security, health or syndicate services. In this way, access to administrative contacts was evident as one of the most important sources of power they had among *favelados*, it being essential for understanding politics in the spatiality (Perlman, 2002).

These findings led the author to conclude that, despite politics not being the dominant interest in the lives of *favelados*, they were not absolutely apathetic and acquiescent. They were sensibly concerned about the issues that affected them most directly, and they shared common sense in order to defend their interests as best as possible and to do as little harm to the system as possible. Leaders had more active participation in all sectors of activity, but followed the same strategy of minimizing risks and maximizing gains. Within the Brazilian reality at the time, this meant the opposite of marginality - it meant serene and orderly integration into the current political regime. Nonetheless, the ruling classes' fear of subversion and anti-social behavior raised a host of widespread stereotypes about *favela* radicalism (Perlman, 2002).

Although Brazilian society is not based on broad kinship groups or clans, kinship ties are strong. The crony system, in turn, elevates the friend to the position of "almost relative". Almost two thirds of migrants find their first job through the help of friends or relatives. Another 13% already had a job arranged (including more women than men). Only 23 percent had to fend for themselves or look for a job on their own, going door-to-door, or through newspaper advertisements and employment agencies.

Smith and Inkeles (1966), through the Overall Modernity scale, when applied by Perlman (2002) as indicators of the degree of traditionalism-modernity, indicated the factors religiosity, openness to innovation, family orientation and empathy. which contradicted the various hypotheses about the "culture of poverty" (Lewis, 1996), as well as other myths built around the marginal character of these spatialities.

Regarding the religious orientation factor, 94% considered themselves followers of some religion: 72% Catholics, 10% Assembly of God, 5% Baptists, 5% Spiritists, and 4% other

denominations. However, 58% declared that they did not belong to any religious organization, and only 3% of those who did regularly attend the services. Likewise, few were dogmatic, neither showing ruptures nor fanaticism (Perlman, 2002).

As for openness to innovation, respondents were relatively open to science and technology, but more hesitant about changes in traditional practices. Generally speaking, they were extraordinarily eager to adopt everything that seemed new and modern, holding back more for economic reasons than for attitude. They tended, in this regard, to find themselves among the first to adopt fashionable clothes, listen to the latest American musical news, and buy new gadgets whenever possible.

With regard to personal values, 72% of men and 70% of women were sympathetic to the idea of constituting a modern group, perhaps more than the middle class, usually taken as a means of comparison. The birth rate was significantly lower than in the interior. They showed high levels of secularization, cognitive flexibility and empathy. Education was almost revered in the *favela*. Anyone with a college degree was respectfully treated as a holder of a Ph.D. (Perlman, 2002). Generally speaking, the aspirations of these outsiders did not differ from those of the middle class (Portes, 1969), even displaying optimism about the future of their children and new generations.

According to Perlman's findings (2002, p 190), the Catacumba *favelados* had neither a subculture of traditionalism nor of poverty. According to the author, "when *favela* dwellers say that 'the poor don't have a chance', or that trying something 'is no use', they are not reflecting innate resignation or fatalism, but they are realistically assessing their situation. If barriers in their path were changed, they could respond quite differently."

Perlman's (2002) data revealed, however, a high degree of submission to authority, but this concept was another that needed to be carefully interpreted. For the author, egalitarian norms were the exception, not the rule, in Brazilian social and political life. Passivity and respect for authority were indoctrinated by the prevalence of the dictatorial regime imposed by the military, with support from the United States government.

Similarly, the hypotheses that *favelados* contribute little to the economy in terms of labor or consumption were not confirmed. According to data collected by Perlman (2002), only 10% of male workers carried out their activities in their own community, while the rest contributed directly to the external metropolitan economy. Nearly a third of *favela* women worked in domestic services that the middle class considered essential. Only 32% of *favelados* were considered at the time as unskilled, carrying out activities, for the most part, that needed to be done, generating income that recirculated in the economy (Perlman, 2002).

The *favelados* also contributed in the sphere of consumption. 92% bought clothes and 72% of their food outside the community. Despite their low incomes, they constituted an important market for consumer goods. At the time of the survey, 35% were paying installments, 24% for household items and 11% for clothes and shoes.

The respondents surveyed also contributed to the economy through entrepreneurial activities within the community. Four out of ten built their own house. Between 5% and 10% built tents, shops or bars on which municipal taxes were levied (Perlman, 2002).

At the same time, the data refuted myths about the prevailing work ethic in these communities. Contrary to the typical ideal, the *favelados* valued work, scientific technology and expressed respect for impersonal bureaucratic relationships. (Perlman, 2002).

Finally, contrary to general belief, the *favelados* declared themselves reasonably satisfied with their lives and prospects for the future. Nine out of ten mentioned aspects of their current lives in the city that they particularly enjoyed, and 70% said there was as much or more mutual help in the *favela* than in their places of origin.

## **DÉPAYSEMENT AND ITS IMPACTS**

In 1970, the Catacumba residents were transferred to different housing complexes in Rio de Janeiro, and immediately began to experience the consequences of the change in the most different instances: economic, social, cultural, political and psychological.

In economic terms, for the workers, the repercussions were felt in the precariousness, time and money spent on transport to work; in the difficulty of finding work - or “odd jobs” -, especially for women; and in the need to pay monthly installments on the property mortgage. Equally, for the *favela* merchants, the impact was totally devastating. They were forced to close their businesses, either due to the loss of customers or the sheer expense of new licenses; either because of the prohibition to use part of their houses to install their business, or even because of abusive rent levels for new stores.

In sociocultural terms, as former residents were scattered into the new housing developments based on income level rather than their social and family relationships, the *favelas'* support structures did not resist eradication. Added to this was the isolation, not only geographical, leading to a feeling of distance from the center of urban life and activities. As a result, perceptions of suspicion and distrust arose, as did the perception of an increase in the crime rate. In the United States, theses defended by Jacobs (2011) corroborated as follows: “Those who live in the complexes say repeatedly that there is more violence in them than in the *favela*, and more street fights, children are more abused and there is less concern for one another. They say they are afraid to go out at night, and, in the meantime, the government postpones the installation of public lighting” (Perlman, 2002, p. 259).

Likewise, with the removal, the community leaders were the first to be removed and either disappeared or were sent to settlements distant from each other and their constituents. Those who attempted to found new neighborhood associations or other organizations found apathy and distrust among the neighbors, and such a pervasive feeling of fear and despair that it became unfeasible even to get people to attend a meeting.

In any case, the elimination of the old leaders and their role as mediators (“brokers”), led residents to become personally involved in the intricacies of the official bureaucracy, facing the material difficulties of reaching the city center, making the “procedures” even more difficult.

With the country's re-democratization in the 1980s, little by little, a set of factors converged to re-question the way of seeing the *favela* and its removal from problem to solution.

On an international level, criticisms have been developed in relation to the distance between urban planners and architects, between formal projects and reality. In this direction, authors such as Jane Jacobs and Herbert Gans contributed substantially to the replacement of projects that deny access to the city (Jacobs, 2011; Gans, 1982). Likewise, the change in perspective can be explained by pressures arising from residents and their organizations, opposing the removal and defending the constitution of legal statutes for their districts and the installation of public services, as in other parts of the cities (Valladares, 2005).

In Brazil, the economic crisis of the 1980s, associated with austere programs of productive restructuring and reduction of public investments, presented a systematic increase in agglomerations. Concomitantly, the end of media censorship expanded the news about violence, drug trafficking and crime in the Rio *favelas* and the city's surroundings, configuring them as a specificity of the wonderful city, and increasing the “formal” city's inhabitants fear of the population of the “hills”, a duality reinforced by the diffusion of adjectives, such as “split city” and “divided city” (Ventura, 1984).

In the 1990s, the issue of the *favela* returned to the fore in academic circles with a growing volume of studies and scientific research on the subject. Concomitantly, data from the 1991 and 2000 censuses indicated a growth in the number of agglomerations that were

expanding to other regions, such as Jacarepaguá and Barra da Tijuca, following the process of construction of closed condominiums, destined for the upper middle classes (Valladares, 2005; Ribeiro, 1997).

Currently, estimates by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – IBGE (2020) indicate, for the country, 13,151 subnormal agglomerations (*favelas*), comprising 5.1 million households. Only surpassed by the city of São Paulo, with 529,921 households in subnormal agglomerations, Rio de Janeiro city has 453,571 households in this category, representing 12.63% of its total number.

## **SPECTRA AND LESSONS FROM CATACUMBA**

The groups thus exploited are not marginal, but largely integrated into the system, functioning as one of its vital parts. In short, integration does not always imply reciprocity. Society is a whole, and the question is how the parts fit together. In this case, the marginals are characterized by being permanently outside society, as they do not participate in the common values that define society itself. All this set of hypotheses - whose steps can be followed in sociology from Durkheim to Simmel, Merton and Parsons - is opposed to the conflict model, as every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by others (Dahrendorf, 1959). In this sense, the marginal sector would be no more than one among many groups in competition or conflict - especially a disempowered group, subject to a lot of coercion and coercing very little.

Perlman (2002) noted how the causes and continuation of this condition were not rooted in the *habitus* (Bourdieu, 2021) of the individuals who were in it, and that their attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviors did not include a self-defeating and morality-inhibiting syndrome. One must, therefore, seek some set of circumstances outside individual control. This line of reasoning leads us to examine structural factors or social institutions - the nature of labor and capital markets, the class system and social stratification, and the role of the state in modern capitalist societies, as well as the international context. All these factors exert a powerful influence on the urban inequalities in evidence. It is precisely along these lines that recent work by Latin American theorists on marginality has been conducted.

The key point is that marginality is not due to deficient housing conditions, or to the characteristics of individuals or groups, but to a form of society rooted in the historical process of industrialization and economic growth in peripheral nations, particularly in Latin America. . Marginalization is a consequence of a development model whose fundamental characteristic is the exclusion of vast contingents of the population from its central productive apparatus.

According to data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean – CEPAL, “[...] in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the development of the manufacturing industry throughout the world was inevitably accompanied by a substantial increase in industrial jobs [...]. This no longer occurs. Industrial development in less developed countries means to a large extent the adaptation of advanced techniques [...] In these circumstances, the rapid growth of industrial production does not necessarily imply a significant increase in industrial employment” (CEPAL, 1965, p. 163).

The consequence of this process is a disproportionate number of underemployed people who are not salaried, possess no special credentials, no job security, no social security, no protection by labor legislation, and who live in a state of constant uncertainty (Perlman, 2002). In this scenario, as Quijano (1973, p. 141) registered, “in all modern societies, and at every moment, it was observed that there existed a category of people more or less permanently excluded from the main nucleus of work, and that, due to their insufficient incomes, they did not have access to the consumption of goods and services. [...] But they were isolated individuals, or united in small groups, dispersed, atomized and disconnected from all other

economic sectors of society.” At that time, this author emphasized, “the process compromised vast sectors of the population that, as a result, were no longer isolated and dispersed. It is now a problem that concerns the whole of society, and not exclusively the marginalized”. In other terms, and today more than before, the issue of marginals has become that of the integration of society itself. In certain social groups, it is integrated into the spheres of production and distribution (Quijano, 1966).

While the first industrial revolution occurred alongside the emergence of capitalist forms of market organization, the subsequent steps took place in contexts of markets and industrial spheres of influence already dominated. As Santos (1974) observed, the productive system under dependent capitalism does not expand by eliminating archaic or outdated subsistence sectors, but by transferring the surpluses generated within it to modern advanced sectors (Vernez 1971).

These development stages are not just historical moments, but also specific forms of social and economic organization that are now combined in every society. In the ongoing transition to the fourth industrial revolution, the situation in Latin America implies new forms of dependency. In fact, there have been marginalized sectors at all these stages, but their size and importance have only reached massive proportions in the present mode and structure of production and labor regulation.

In the current scenario, two types of marginals (“outsiders”) are pointed out. On the one hand, a “marginalized bourgeoisie”, composed of self-employed entrepreneurs and highly qualified professionals, whose professions or occupations are eliminated by the introduction of new digitally-based technologies. On the other hand, there are those in a precarious occupational position, constituted mostly of migrants, intermittent workers, exploited Uber drivers, beneficiaries of social assistance programs, and workers earning a universal minimum income.

According to a survey conducted by Frey and Osborne (2013), 46.7% of occupations in the third industrial revolution, by 2030, ceased to have significance in the face of unprecedented technological advances, which opened up paths, at an exponential pace, to new business models and organizational and occupational architectures. Rapidly, hegemonic forms of production and labor regulation became inefficient in the face of new standards of competitiveness, unnecessary or, simply, devoid of markets. In this scenario, a wide range of activities and the individuals affected by them did not disappear. Rather, they became marginalized in relation to emerging forms of businesses and organizations.

A second group, formed of those of precarious occupational status, were unable to find occupation in the “upper circuit of the economy” and forced to accept or develop occupational trajectories that were undervalued in this circuit. Constituting the backbone of the protests on the streets of 353 Brazilian cities in June 2013, this group can be understood as a growing contingent who led a life of insecurity, developing jobs that also give little meaning to their existence (Standing, 2013; Alves, 2011).

The notions of economic circuits are thus quite appropriate for understanding the labor dynamics of the digital economy. Also developed in the 1960s, based on the idea of “space selectivity”, the theory of “superior” and “inferior” circuits assumed that they were structured and singularized due to differences observed in the economic and social spheres. peripheral economies, which gave rise to disparities in geographical and individual situations, as well as pressure for modernization. With such an approach, the “upper circuit” is constituted of modern to hypermodern enterprises, such as financial institutions, export trade, high-tech and value-added industry and services, global commercial platforms and large logistics companies. The “lower circuit” is characterized by small-scale activities, involving non-capital-intensive forms of manufacturing, non-modern services provided to retailers and non-modern commerce essentially aimed at poor populations, strongly rooted and centered on privileged relationships

with the region in which they are located, constituting a source of work, employment and income for a large portion of their population, ensuring the survival – and not the accumulation of capital – of those who operate in it. According to Santos (2012, p. 201), this circuit was “[...] a fundamental element of urban life [...], due to its role as a shelter for the poor, migrant or native of the city, which can only rarely consume and work on the modern circuit”.

This “marginal sector” or “lower circuit of the economy” is nothing new. As shown by Perlman (2002), the two sectors resulted from a single historical process that produced the two poles of Latin American societies (Quijano, 1973). One of the questions that is proposed, however, is to find out what role this large marginal population serves in the new development stage of capitalism.

Under the fourth industrial revolution, large ecosystems and business networks tend to encompass modes of production and labor regulation that require a quantitatively smaller workforce, but one that is increasingly educated, skilled, flexible and adaptable. The rest of the population, in an ever larger contingent, would be responsible for providing services and products with low added value, produced on a large scale by intensively automated production and management systems, capable of dealing with mass production at low cost.

The coexistence of production modes - traditional, modern and postmodern, at the same time, produces an extreme case of marginalization that goes beyond the situation characterized by the coexistence of still archaic production modes in a single market economy (Kowarick, 1974), implying no longer integration between the upper and lower circuits of the economy, but the intensification of the separation between the "connected" and the "precarious", between the new modalities of "winners" and "losers" of the fourth industrial revolution, commonly referred to as the adoption of digital technologies, sensors, wireless networks, as well as the incorporation of robots and increasingly intelligent machines, with the potential for radical changes in the way products are produced and distributed. The name for this revolution was first used during the 2011 edition of the Hannover (Germany) international fair. Since then, the expression has been quickly incorporated into business discourse, whether in economically developed or developing countries, under different names: Intelligent Factories, Industrial Internet of Things, Intelligent Industry or Advanced Manufacturing (Schwab, 2016).

For some authors, the tendency no longer seems to emphasize alternatives of capitalism oriented to the inclusion of the “marginals”, through complementary relations between the upper and lower circuits of the economy. On the contrary, demographic and geopolitical changes, environmental limitations and technological advances typical of the fourth industrial revolution, with extensive use of automation, robotics, sensors and other forms of non-human intelligence, have rendered obsolete a wide range of occupations, not only at a technical-specialized level - including drivers, sales professionals, bank staff - as well as professions highly valued throughout the previous three industrial revolutions, such as lawyers, doctors, bureaucrats and managers of public, private and tertiary-sector institutions. In general, the set of operational and transactional occupations have tended to be impacted or automated, leaving the human - at least until the transhumanist project is materialized (Kurzweil, 2007) - activities that depend on what is most human to them: a mobilization of subjectivity, desires, creativity, capacity for creation and innovation.

By leaving the “invisible hand of the market” free, the trend seems to be unrestrained expansion of the concentration levels of income and wealth. Economists further estimate scenarios in which, around the large parent corporations - directly or indirectly controlled by about 1% of the global population, would gravitate around 20% of the global population, highly educated, qualified and endowed with multiple competences, acting under multiple work links, intense pressure to mobilize their subjectivities and continuous updating, in addition to stressful competition and obsession with demand for ever-increasing results. At the other extreme, no longer the dream of the large consumer middle classes, nor of the proletariat or even the

marginal “reserve army” of the Fordist era, but the remaining 80% of the population, no longer in the interest of the great post-Fordist capital, which, even with no alternatives to being explored, would fit other modes of economic and societal relations, such as barter, solidarity economy, community relations based on local currencies, community entrepreneurship and/or universal income social programs (Dowbor, 2018; Haskel & Westlake, 2018; Mason, 2017).

As data from Oxfam (2019) showed, around 1% of the richest people in the world have more than double the wealth owned by 6.9 billion people, or 92% of the world's population. Nearly half of the world's population lives on less than five *euros* a day, the pace of poverty reduction has fallen by half since 2013, the vast majority of the world's adult population (about three billion) possesses savings less than ten thousand dollars, and 57% of the planet's most disadvantaged people own less than 2% of the world's private wealth.

Paradoxically, these same contingents jettisoned from the global business ecosystems, the popular, peripheral and “marginal” sectors - in particular, the *favelados* - start to constitute an essential coacervate for studies and experiments by the large platforms, networks and organizational arrangements that replace the mass production industries typical of the Fordist era - converted into “unlit industries”, as they constitute a *habitus*, in the essential coacervate of competence attributes - creativity, flexibility, adaptability, empathy, resilience, ability to deal with uncertainties, with diversity and uncertainties (WEF, 2020) - to be mapped and converted into distinctive approaches, methodologies and algorithms for the upper circuit of economics of the fourth industrial revolution.

In this direction, contrary to criticisms that suggest that Bourdieu's sociological approach was restricted to the study of the inherent dynamics of industrial society, by ignoring transition processes and coexistence with post-industrial society, the studies of Perlman (2002) are revisited in the light of Bourdieusian notions of *habitus* and *dépaysement*, myths are deconstructed as to their potential, not only in the analysis of “modernization” processes inherent in previous stages, but also in the ongoing transition to the fourth industrial revolution, catalyzed by the Covid 19 pandemic.

Likewise, its potential for contributing to the understanding that social actors, endowed with similar or distinct *habitus* and unequally distributed capital, interrelate within a social space, in which conflicts and alliances unfold, in the search of the maintenance or transformation of the current state of power - or rather, of domination.

Perlman's (2002) studies were not immune to criticism either. First, her considerations regarding the theory of marginality were criticized for not being original, not even pioneering (Valladares, 2005; Pino, 1996; Velho, 1977; Leeds & Leeds, 1974). Oliven (1978, p. 35) also commented on Perlman's view of the poor, stating that the *favelados* “[...] in short, have the aspirations of the bourgeoisie, the perseverance of the pioneers, and the values of the patriots” (Perlman, 2002, p. 286), the author “[...] ignores the danger of overemphasizing the good qualities of the poor”, accepting “[...] that they need to be defended and their virtues proved. In this sense, she “[...] ends up placing herself in the liberal perspective of showing that *favelados* are not different from the rest of the population without, however, having studied other groups with which she could compare them”.

Nevertheless, Perlman's studies are, even today, the most referenced on the subject, both in Brazil and in the United States. Additionally, their rigor, richness and methodological diversity, incorporating, like Bourdieu, different research techniques - statistics, interviews, participant observation, photographic records - make them significant for historical and comparative analyses.

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